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KEY MESSAGES
EXPERIENCE WITH AN SOP UNDER  
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
  Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a monetary Share of 
Proceeds (SOP) for administrative purposes (in this study we use the term 
“administration SOP”) was levied on credit issuance, whereas an in-kind 
SOP of 2% of issued carbon credits was allocated to the Adaptation Fund 
(AF) (in this study, we use the term “adaptation SOP”). 
  Due to the unexpectedly positive development of the CDM activity pipeline, 
the administration SOP led to huge revenues (to date USD 356 million). 
Annual SOP revenues exceeded the actual administrative costs by up to a 
factor of three. The accumulated reserve that reached a maximum of USD 
200 million in 2012 allowed to continue to operate the administrative struc-
ture of the CDM for almost a full decade after the crash of the CDM market 
and still stands at over USD 100 million. The lesson here is that a monetary 
SOP can become “sticky” and is not adjusted even when it became clear that 
the fee level was too high.
  The in-kind SOP generated 38 million credits, whose sale brought revenues 
of USD 200 million, much less than the administration SOP, monetization 
guidelines, required the World Bank as trustee to maintain a reserve of 
credits when prices were high. Had all credits beyond that reserve been 
sold immediately, the revenue could have been increased by USD 40 mil-
lion. The guidelines were adapted after the price crash but then it was too 
late. The key lesson is that in-kind SOP revenues crucially depend on the 
market price of credits and that accumulation of credit reserves is risky in 
periods of falling prices. 
  With the Doha Amendment, the adaptation SOP was extended to JI and 
international emissions trading in the second commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, but as the amendment has not entered into force, this 
provision has not triggered any SOP. Given that the ratification threshold 
is close, a dedicated Doha Amendment ratification push could ensure the 
Amendment enters into force and provides a precedent for the Paris Agree-
ment (PA).
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STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING  
THE SOP IN ARTICLE 6 
  The PA defines an SOP in Article 6.6 to be generated through Art. 6.4 activi-
ties. It is silent regarding an SOP for cooperative approaches under Art. 6.2.
  In Katowice, negotiations saw a stalemate between many developing 
country Parties pushing to extend the SOP to Art. 6.2 and industrialized 
countries unwilling to accept it. The Polish Presidency failed to resolve the 
controversy. 
  For Art. 6.4, Parties seem to agree on levying a monetary and an in-kind 
SOP, whereas for Art. 6.2, only an in-kind SOP seems to be considered. Most 
technical questions remain wide open, such as the relative size of monetary 
versus in-kind SOP, the level of the in-kind SOP and the point of taxation. 
  The destination of adaptation SOP revenues to the Adaptation Fund has 
already been settled through decisions taken by the Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) and 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in Katowice in December 2018.
SOP FOR THE ARTICLE 6.4 MECHANISM
  Levying both an administrative and an adaptation SOP at the point of credit 
issuance, as currently proposed in the Katowice Presidency draft text, is the 
most suitable option and reduces transaction costs.
  The administrative and adaptation SOP should be levied as a mix of mon-
etary fees and in-kind payments to have a balance between stable income 
and the option to benefit from higher market prices as well as limiting the 
burden on project developers. The CMA could then decide on a regular ba-
sis, e.g. (bi)annually, how much is needed to cover administrative expenses 
upon budgetary estimations and justifications from the Supervisory Board, 
while the rest would go to fund the Adaptation Fund. 
  A share of the administration SOP should be earmarked for administrative 
costs at the host country level. The level of the share depends on the actual 
tasks allocated to the host countries.
  The CDM exempts project activities in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
from SOP payments and reduces the burden for micro- and small-scale 
activities. Yet, the Katowice draft texts currently do not foresee a differenti-
ated treatment for any category of activities.
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SOP FOR COOPERATIVE APPROACHES  
UNDER ARTICLE 6.2
  Creating stable new sources of long-term finance for adaptation is the key 
argument for extending the SOP to cooperative approaches. Another im-
portant consideration is to ensure equal treatment of both Art. 6.2 and Art. 
6.4, avoiding incentives to bypass the global mechanism.
  The argument that a SOP on Art. 6.2 is not technically feasible due to the 
heterogeneous nature of cooperative approaches (linking of domestic emis-
sion trading schemes, bilateral baseline and credit systems) can be coun-
tered by introducing a monetary SOP on annual transferred net amounts 
of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). This is feasible 
for any type of cooperative approach and even if ITMOs are denominated in 
metrics other than CO²e. Therefore, the specific features of crediting mech-
anisms and ETS linking do not present a barrier for introducing an SOP.
  The SOP should be charged to the acquiring Party just as a value-added tax 
is levied on the end-user of a good, considering the ability to pay as well as 
where the economic benefit accrues.
  Even under Art. 6.2, an administrative SOP is relevant as central costs of 
cooperative approaches are not zero. Thus, a monetary SOP should be 
charged whose value would be set in the way proposed for the administra-
tive SOP for Art. 6.4.
  Host countries of activities under Art. 6.2 should be entitled to a share of 
administrative SOP to cover their administrative costs. If it is impossible to intro-
duce an SOP for Art. 6.2, host countries need to consider the administrative costs in 
their negotiations with ITMO buyers.
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1. CONTEXT
The Share of Proceeds (SOP) - an international tax on activities and/or emission credits 
generated by international market mechanisms for climate change mitigation - is not a 
new concept for climate negotiators. Prior to the Paris Agreement (PA), a provision for a SOP 
was defined in Art. 12.8 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), which elaborated that an SOP from activ-
ities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is to be channelled toward both 
administrative expenses of the CDM (in this study we use the term “administration SOP”) as 
well as toward helping developing countries meet the costs of adapting to climate change 
(“adaptation SOP”). The administration SOP is levied as monetary fee at issuance of CDM cred-
its (CERs) while the adaptation SOP is levied in kind, in form of 2% of issued CERs that are then 
given to the Adaptation Fund (AF). CDM activities in LDCs are exempt from the SOP.
When it became evident that a new climate regime was needed to replace the KP and to 
increase ambition and mitigation efforts of countries, climate negotiations in Doha, Qatar, in 
2012 led to an amendment to the KP by decision 1/CMP.8 (the so-called Doha Amendment) 
for the KP’s second commitment period 2013-2020. In the Doha Amendment, Parties to the KP 
reaffirmed (section V, paras 20-22) that the adaptation SOP and its rate of 2% of CERs issued 
and extended it to all Kyoto mechanisms. The AF would receive 2% of the first international 
transfers of assigned amount units (AAUs), the issuance of emission reduction units (ERUs) for 
Joint Implementation projects, and the conversion to ERUs of AAUs or removal units (RMUs) 
from forestry projects held previously by Parties. It also reaffirmed the LDC exemption from 
SOPs. While as of May 2019, 128 Parties have deposited their instrument of acceptance, given 
the ratification threshold of 144 Parties, the Doha Amendment to the KP has not entered 
into force and this provision has not triggered any SOP. With a substantial number of African 
countries and LDCs not having done so, African countries may consider a coordinated 
Doha amendment push to close the remaining gap and have the Amendment enter into 
force before COP 25.
Building on these precedents, the Paris Agreement (PA) introduces an SOP in Art. 6.6: 
The CMA shall ensure that a share of proceeds from activities under the mechanisms referred 
to in Art 6.4 is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation.
This means the SOP will be levied through the Art. 6.4 mechanism. However, several 
aspects related to the operationalization of the SOP are being debated, including
 • how to levy it
 • how to convert credits into revenues
 • when and how to utilize the proceeds, and
 •  what a reasonable tax rate would be (in terms of percentage rate). 
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With Parties deciding at COP 24 in Katowice that the AF is to serve the PA (decisions 13/CMA.1 
and 1/CMP.14), the operationalization of the SOP under Art. 6.4 has become more certain. 
The situation is very different for the Art. 6.2 cooperative approaches for which the PA does 
not contain a similar provision but where the negotiation texts from Katowice introduce (vol-
untary) SOPs. The silence of the Paris text on the applicability of SOP for Art. 6.2 is being inter-
preted differently by negotiating Parties and continues to be a highly political debate. Some 
Parties, including the Umbrella Group and the EU, are opposed to an SOP for Art. 6.2 activi-
ties as they assert that this would represent a disincentive for cooperative approaches and 
would not be technically feasible for linking emissions trading schemes. Whether this argu-
ment is valid, will be discussed below. On the other hand, key Party alliances such as Africa, 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Arab Group, LDCs and the Like-Minded Devel-
oping Countries (LMDCs) support the SOP for Art. 6.2. These Parties seek increased ambition 
with regard to resource mobilization for adaptation. As well, they look for balance and equity 
between Art. 6.2 and Art. 6.4, sharing the concern that the internationally supervised Art. 6.4 
mechanism might be disadvantaged if the SOP would not be applied to “competing” bilateral 
cooperative approaches under Art. 6.2. They also raise an important element of the broader 
climate finance debate, arguing that SOP-based replenishments of the AF increase the pre-
dictability and long-term sustainability of the Fund compared to relying on ad-hoc donations 
by rich countries. Another argument is that Parties that are not sufficiently contributing to 
adaptation finance will now do it through paying the SOP for it when acquiring ITMOs. It is 
also not clear how stable and secure Art. 6.4 alone will emerge as a funding source for the AF, 
since this depends on the volume and value of available Art. 6.4. units, and levying the SOP 
on Art. 6.2 units. 
The political nature of the SOP for Art. 6.2 debate is captured in the various draft texts – the 
SBSTA text, the L24 “lost text1” and the Presidency text – produced at COP 24 in Katowice (see 
Table 2 in the Annex). The “lost text” by the Presidency was an attempt to keep the SOP vol-
untary, but this attempt failed. Text on SOP was reintroduced based on the SBSTA text and 
heavily bracketed. In the end, there was no progression on this issue. 
Most Parties would argue that the SOP is a political decision to be taken by negotia-
tions. However, there are many technical implications of different taxation options 
that need to be understood. A full understanding of these might be useful to find 
compromise solutions in the best interest of all Parties. 
On this basis, this paper firstly provides an overview of the SOP under the CDM and the experi-
ences with fostering predictability and financial sustainability. The second section looks at the 
SOP under the Art. 6.4 mechanism and tackles questions on how to operationalize an Art. 6.4 
SOP. Building on this, the final section addresses the operationalization of an SOP under Art. 
6.2 cooperative approaches. For each section, we provide recommendations to be considered 
in the negotiation process. 
1 The text L.24 was deleted from the UNFCCC document repository after its publication on December 14, 2018.
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2 . BACKGROUND: THE CDM EXPERIENCE
The operationalization of the SOP under the CDM offers valuable lessons to be considered 
in the negotiations on the rulebook for Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement. In short, two different 
types of levies were chosen for administrative and adaptation purposes. The adaptation SOP 
has 2% of CERs issued forwarded to a holding account of the AF established inside the CDM 
registry. A dedicated trust fund operated by the World Bank monetizes the CERs to generate 
revenues for the AF. The administration SOP is levied as a monetary fee of USD 0.10 per CER 
for the first 15,000 tCO²e, for which issuance is requested in a given calendar year, and USD 
0.20 per CER for any amount in excess of 15,000 tCO²e in that year. The CDM EB preferred 
cash payments, as it needed resources to kick-start the mechanism and could not wait until 
the market for selling CERs was established. The administration SOP is therefore levied as 
advance payment to be made at registration with the remainder due at issuance. Further-
more, the CDM EB wanted to avoid the costs associated with setting up a system to monetize 
the CERs (UNFCCC 2006)2. Activities in LDCs are exempt from SOP payments. Further exempt 
are activities with an expected issuance of less than 15,000 tCO²e and for the first 10 activities 
in a country (UNFCCC 2017b). 
2.1  REVENUES GENERATED FOR ADAPTATION PURPOSES  
UNDER THE CDM
One of the World Bank’s core functions as trustee of the AF is to sell the CERs levied for the 
adaptation SOP. As of July 2018, over 38 million CERs have been transferred to the AF. The 
monetization of the CERs has only started in 2009 and generated revenues of about USD 200 
million. 
The revenues generated through the SOP have been smaller than expected. One reason lies 
in the monetization strategy of the trustee. In the initial years, the trustee opted to build up a 
reserve in CERs instead of selling them, also due to somewhat inflexible monetization guide-
lines of the trust fund (AF Board 2008) that included the requirement to hold a minimum stock 
of CERs. However, at the end of 2011 the CERs held reached four times the minimum stock 
volume of 1 million CER. Therefore, the crash in market prices in 2011 severely impacted the 
AF and the volume of missed revenues quickly reached over USD 50 million (about USD 40 
million for the volume above the reserve level of 1 million CERs), calculated as the difference 
between the CER price valid when the CERs accrued and the price for which the CERs were 
sold afterwards. Over the entire period from 2009 to 2018, the trust fund monetized the CERs 
for USD 5.2 per CER on average. 
As a result, the monetization of CERs only covers roughly a quarter of the cumulative resources 
of the AF. The Fund relies heavily on donations from donor countries, which have amounted 
to USD 636 million over the years (AF Trust Fund 2018). At COP 24 alone, several countries, 
including Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, and New Zealand, and Ireland, announced 
2 Additionally, the CDM EB generates revenues through accreditation fees and fees for the approval of baseline and 
monitoring methodologies If a project was approved in conjunction with a new methodology, the fee for the approval 
of the methodology was counted as an advance payment of the share of proceeds.
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Figure 2: Revenues generated and CER stock 
accumulated in the AF trust fund, 2009-2018
Source: Adaptation Fund Trust Fund 2018
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Figure 1: Cumulative resources of the 
Adaptation Fund in USD millions as of 
December 2018
Source: Adaptation Fund Trust Fund 2018
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new pledges for the AF, totalling USD 129 
million. 
In reaction to the heavy losses incurred, the 
monetization guidelines of the trust fund 
were amended in 2012, with the restrictive 
rules abolished in order to be able to sell 
CERs when prices are high (Adaptation Fund 
Board 2012). Since 2015, the trustee has 
been able to achieve high prices on transac-
tions of a smaller volume. However, the rev-
enues generated are much lower than in the 
first years of the monetization program due 
to the much lower volumes. Over 10 million 
CERs remain unsold.
In sum, the in-kind taxation for adaptation 
purposes was beneficial for the AF when 
prices where high, but revenues dwindled 
when market prices fell. Even if the trustee 
is obtaining high prices in some transactions 
for the AF, the predictability of the revenue 
streams from CER sales is very low. The 
AF continues to be dependent on donor 
contributions. 
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2.2  REVENUES GENERATED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES 
UNDER THE CDM
The situation is very different for the CDM EB, which benefited from a more stable source 
of income through monetary taxation for registration and issuance. Even though reve-
nues declined when CDM activities became less profitable, the EB was able to accumulate 
an important reserve in the “gold rush period” that it can still rely on today. The SOP was the 
largest contributor to the revenues of the CDM EB, even if voluntary contributions did play 
a role in the early implementation period. 
Accreditation and methodology related fees 
levied additionally to the administration SOP 
only played a minor role. 
The inflows to the CDM trust fund rose con-
siderably beyond expectations due to signif-
icant demand by private and public entities. 
The secretariat had estimated 100 requests 
for project registration/year, but the actual 
number quickly exceeded 500. Also, more 
projects than initially expected were large 
industrial gas projects, generating millions 
of CERs and therefore related fees. By June 
2012, the CDM trust fund had an accumu-
lated surplus of USD 131.2 million (with-
out a reserve the Secretariat established), 
three times higher than the annual expen-
diture financed out of the fund at that time. 
As resources generated were not allowed 
to cross-finance other expenses of the sec-
retariat, the volume of CDM staff and 
Figure 3: Prices obtained for monetization 
of CERs for AF, 2009-2018 
Source: Adaptation Fund Trust Fund (2018)
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Figure 4: CDM EB income  
through administrative SOP  
in USD million, 2003-2017
Source: authors’ elaboration based on annual reports of 
the CDM EB to the CMP, 2002-2018
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expenditures rose significantly, probably beyond the level that was really neces-
sary (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017). Interestingly, the level of monetary SOP was never 
adjusted despite the accumulation of surplus. 
With the crash in market prices, the CDM lost its attractiveness and incomes through fees fell 
massively. An increasing number of project developers did not request forwarding of issued 
CERs to their accounts anymore and the amount of uncollected SOP fees increased. There-
fore, the CDM EB tightened the rules on the levy in December 2017 to levy the SOP 
before an issuance is requested (UNFCCC 2017a)3. 
This attracted criticism from the private sector, as it was seen as penalising project developers 
and smaller companies (Allcott 2018). In times of diminishing returns of investment in CDM activi-
ties, the financial burden of paying the SOP increased. In particular, the need to pay the SOP in 
advance before monetizing CERs on the market can be a risk for smaller companies. In addition, 
project developers face the risk of financial penalties if they withdraw requests for issuance or 
if their issuance is rejected. Developers stand to lose up to USD 30,000 for each issuance that is 
withdrawn after it has been either published or rejected.
3  At its 96th meeting the CDM EB decided that starting January 2018, project participants who have approved 
requests for issuance with pending payments of their SOP for administration may opt to pay the SOP in up to three 
instalments per issuance. The instalment should be at least USD 1500 unless it is the last instalment for the issuance, 
in which case it should be at least USD 500. CERs should only be released for forwarding/voluntary cancellation in 
proportion to the SOP paid. For requests for issuance submitted after 1 June 2018, the SOP for administration shall 
be payable in full prior to the commencement of a completeness check for a request for issuance.
Figure 5: CDM EB income, expenditures and accumulated surplus in USD million,  
2003-2017
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on annual reports of the CDM EB to the CMP, 2002-2018
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2.3  GENERAL LESSONS FROM 
THE SOP UNDER THE CDM
The monetary administration SOP became 
a much higher source of income for 
the UNFCCC Secretariat than expected. 
Despite high surpluses being accumulated, 
tax rates were not changed. Thus, under Art. 
6, procedures should be built in to revisit 
administration SOP rates regularly.
On the other hand, the in-kind adaptation 
SOP failed to become the key source of rev-
enues for the AF as which it had been envis-
aged. This was due to the onset of the CER 
price crash before the bulk of the CER inflow 
occurred. Until today, its total monetary 
value reaches only about a third of the over-
all value of the SOP (see Figure 6).
When designing the adaptation SOP under 
the Art. 6 mechanisms, two different objec-
tives can be pursued: (1) A monetary fee 
would serve the objective of delivering a more predictable and stable source of income; (2) An 
in-kind contribution in credits would lead to higher revenues in case of market price increases. 
A key lesson from the CDM is that the second objective is associated with a significant risk, as 
witnessed by the AF.
3. SOP FOR THE ARTICLE 6.4 MECHANISM
As the Paris Agreement specifically mentions the applicability of share of proceeds for admin-
istrative and adaptation purposes in the context of the Art. 6.4 mechanism, it is not a conten-
tious issue in the negotiations per se. However, the overall level of taxation is. Furthermore, 
there are some technical details that require further thinking. 
Both the SBSTA and the Presidency texts converge on levying an administration SOP in the 
form of monetary fees in the same manner as under the CDM at registration and issuance 
(the “lost text” is not relevant, as it did not introduce specific suggestions). The level remains 
undetermined; while in the SBSTA text the authority to determine this was the Supervisory 
Board, in the Presidency text it is now the CMA. 
On the operationalization of the adaptation SOP, all options in the text seem to refer to an 
in-kind contribution. More options have been discussed in the negotiations regarding the 
point of collection. The SBSTA-text contains the following ones: 
Figure 6: Accumulated revenues for 
administrative and adaptation purposes 
through share of proceeds under the CDM, 
2003-2017
Source: Authors based on Adaptation Fund Trust Fund 
(2018) and the annual reports of the CDM EB to the CMP, 
2002-2018
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 •  Collecting SOP at the point of issuance: here, the project developer would pay the SOP. 
Furthermore, the point of collection would be the same for the administration and the 
adaptation SOP. It is the easiest option and the only one retained in the Presidency text. 
 •  Collecting SOP at transfer/first forwarding: here, the project developer would 
only pay the adaptation SOP at the point of selling the credits or retiring the credits 
by forwarding it to the voluntary cancellation account. This limits the financial 
risk for the project developer and the buyer can be charged with the associated 
costs. The inherent risk of this option is that in times of low demand, no or only 
limited transfer/forwarding would occur and no adaptation SOP would be collected. 
 •  Collecting the SOP at every transfer/increasing SOP at every subsequent transfer: 
beyond the risks presented for levying SOP at the point of transfer, this option would 
increase the financial burden in particular for traders and could have negative effects 
on the fungibility of the A6.4ERs on the market. It would also increase the complexities 
in administrating the adaptation SOP. If SOP was to be collected at every transfer, this 
would also apply for transfers between national registries. Governments would then be 
responsible for collecting the SOP and forwarding it to the AF account in the UNFCCC 
registry. 
Differentiating between a monetary fee for administration SOP and an in-kind contribution 
for the AF would represent a simple continuity from the CDM world with the same advantages 
and disadvantages as discussed above. An alternative would be to levy both administra-
tion and adaptation SOP as a mix of monetary fees and in-kind payments in order 
to achieve a balance between stable income, option to benefit from higher market 
prices and limiting the burden on project developers. The Supervisory Body or the CMA 
could then annually decide how much is needed to cover administrative expenses, while the 
rest could go toward funding the AF. The AF would not be as dependent on the market prices 
for A6.4ERs as it has been on the CER price, while still being able to fully benefit from positive 
market developments. Further safeguards and robust guidance could be needed to ensure a 
just repartition of revenues between a functioning administration and adaptation finance and 
avoid that the Supervisory Body overestimates its administrative budget needs. 
The level of taxation will most likely depend on the agreement to be found on the applicabil-
ity of SOP in Art. 6.2 transactions. If the SOP was to be extended to all cooperative approaches, 
an adaptation tax of 5% could be seen as too high for different activity types eligible under 
Art. 6.2 cooperative approaches by those parties that have reservations against the approach. 
A lower level could be agreed in order to establish a level-playing field for both market-based 
forms of voluntary cooperation under Art. 6.2 and Art. 6.4. 
When deciding the SOP level, negotiators should also consider that the SOP will be paid by 
activity developers in the current status of both texts. The Art. 6.4 mechanism as a UNF-
CCC-governed mechanism is more likely to be used by developing countries as it limits the 
administrative and capacity burden on government agencies. A higher SOP is therefore 
likely to have a disproportionately large impact on activity developers in developing 
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countries, in particular if no SOP will apply to Art. 6.2 transfers. An increasing SOP at every 
time of transfer, as mentioned in one of the options in the SBSTA text, is unlikely to be agree-
able in the negotiations, also due to the complexities in implementation. It would further-
more curtail the fungibility of A6.4ERs and its attractiveness of the Art. 6.4 mechanism in the 
absence of a harmonized solution. Essentially, it would prevent the emergence of a liquid 
secondary market.
4.  SOP FOR THE ARTICLE 6. 2  
COOPER ATIVE APPROACHES
With varying Party interests and stakes in the matter, the SOP under Art. 6.2 is highly con-
tentious on the political level. Due to SOP being levied on all Kyoto mechanisms in the Doha 
Amendment, the concept of an SOP for Art. 6.2 became embedded in the various drafts of the 
Art. 6.2 guidance in Katowice. Politically, the levy of a SOP on cooperative approaches was one 
of the breaking points in the Art. 6 negotiations. In the “lost text”, the Polish Presidency sought 
to break the stalemate through the introduction of a voluntary SOP (the SOP “could” be levied) 
and by leaving all design choices open to the participating Parties. This attempt failed and the 
final presidency text contains bracketed provisions for a mandatory SOP. While several Parties 
expressed the view that levying a SOP on cooperative approaches would not be feasible, the 
technical discussion is still in its infancy. By exploring the different options, this paper seeks to 
provide a better foundation to the negotiations. 
The main options captured in the Katowice texts include:
 •  Cooperative approaches [shall] [should] deliver a SOP to meet the costs of adaptation
 •  The SOP to be collected for cooperative approaches that are baseline and crediting /
similar to Art. 6.4 / crediting approaches implemented by parties / all cooperative 
approaches/ all acquisition of ITMOs
 •  The SOP to be set and levied at X percent / 5 percent / an increasing percent / a 
diminishing percent of the amount of ITMOs / increase with each subsequent transfer / 
be consistent with the SOP for the Art. 6.4 mechanism
 •  The SOP to be collected by the issuing / acquiring Party / sent to the Adaptation Fund
Detailed provisions as well as the progression of options from the SBSTA to the Polish presi-
dency texts are captured in Annex 2.
Here we look into the options for levying a SOP under Art. 6.2 from a technical perspective and 
comment on the text options from the vantage point of a smooth functioning of cooperative 
approaches and feasibility of the levy. For the purpose of this analysis, we only focus on those 
aspects that would likely be different from a SOP under Art. 6.4 and assume design choices 
(i.e. percentage rate etc.) as outlined above, to similarly apply. From the list of issues under 
negotiations, we focus on the purpose of the SOP (only adaptation), how to collect the SOP 
for different types of cooperative approaches and which Party should pay the levy. 
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 ITEM REFERENCE DESCRIPTION
(Central) Registry 
for tracking ITMOs
Presidency 
text, Sec. III. 
Annex, para. X. 
Infrastructure
A registry is accessible for each participating 
Party for the tracking of ITMO information. The 
registries perform functions outlined in IV. Track-
ing ITMOs and has the necessary accounts. 
The secretariat is also to implement an interna-
tional or central registry for Parties that do not 
have a registry or access to one.
Art. 6 database Presidency 
text, Sec. III. 
Annex, para. X. 
Infrastructure
The Art. 6 database is implemented by the sec-
retariat and enables the recording and compi-
lation of information regarding corresponding 
adjustments.
Art. 6 Technical 
Expert Review  
(A6 TER)
Presidency 
text, Sec. III. 
Annex, para. II. 
Governance
And VII. Review
The Art. 6 technical expert review is responsible 
for a number of aspects including: 
•  Reviewing the application of guidance by 
participating Parties and recommendations for 
the technical expert review process under Art. 
13.11. 
•  Make recommendations on how Parties can 
improve consistency with guidance
•  Review of the initial report provided by Parties 
when communicating or updating their NDC 
(VII.A. Initial report)
Review information reported in section VII.B. on 
regular information and information recorded on 
corresponding adjustments (IX).
The Secretariat Presidency 
text, Sec. III. 
Annex, para. II. 
Governance
And IX. Recording 
of corresponding 
adjustments
The secretariat is in charge of carrying out related 
activities set out in the Art. 6.2 guidance. The 
secretariat:
•  Periodically prepares a compilation and syn-
thesis of the work and outcomes from the A6 
TER
•  Record information in initial reports in the Art. 
6 database
•  Record information on corresponding adjust-
ments in Art. 6 database 
Compile information in Art. 6 database and 
perform: consistency checks, and notify 
inconsistencies 
Table 1: Overview of administrative costs for Art. 6.2
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First, it is noteworthy that the SOP under Art. 6.2 has thus far only been discussed with respect 
to adaptation as the attention of Parties has been focused on this aspect. The reason may 
be the perception of Parties that the Art. 6.2 cooperative approaches – unlike the CDM and 
the Art. 6.4 mechanism – have a bottom-up structure without central oversight and therefore 
no administrative burden. However, while the administrative costs for Art. 6.2 may be less 
than the expenses generated by the administration of a centralized market mechanism, they 
are not zero. In fact, as the current text stands, Art. 6.2 includes several centralized costs for 
cooperative approaches. These are outlined in more detail below:
The various aspects presented above indicate that even under cooperative approaches, there 
are a number of central functions such as reporting and reviewing information related to 
transactions and corresponding adjustments that would need to be funded. Given the rele-
vant role of comparability and transparency in the PA, it is reasonable to expect a certain level 
of expenses dedicated to ensuring them. Looking at the central functions described above 
and drawing on the experiences with similar functions under the Kyoto Protocol would enable 
a rough estimation regarding the level of costs to be expected. 
Related to this are also potential host country expenses that could arise or increase, when 
countries engage in a cooperative approach. This is important to take into consideration for 
developing countries and especially LDCs. Those host countries that do not have the nec-
essary administrative infrastructures available, but want to engage in Art. 6.2, will need to 
enhance and build up their capacities related to issuing credits, accounting and recording 
data, among others. This issue could be addressed by earmarking a share of the administra-
tion SOP. In any case it is important to identify adequate funding sources to ensure sufficient 
administrative capacity in all countries to participate in cooperative approaches. 
Second, we consider how to collect the SOP for different types of cooperative 
approaches. They are generally identified as being either baseline and crediting type of 
approaches and similar to Art. 6.4 or linking ETS. Other types may exist but are less in focus. 
Linking ETS results in a large amount of transactions that need to be tracked and recorded. 
The abundance of transactions could make the process of applying an SOP complex, if the 
proceeds were to be levied at each individual transfer. An alternative and more straightfor-
ward option is to base the SOP levy on the net annual flow of ITMOs between the coop-
erating countries. Pursuant to paragraph VII.B.26.b of the Presidency’s textual proposal on 
Art. 6.2, Parties will need to annually submit a report on the cumulative ITMOs transferred. 
Moreover, pursuant to Art. 77(d) of Decision 18/CMA.1 (modalities, procedures and guide-
lines for the transparency framework), Parties participating in cooperative approaches need 
to provide in their biennial transparency reports an emissions balance reflecting the level of 
emissions covered by Parties’ NDCs adjusted on the basis of corresponding adjustments. The 
SOP therefore, could easily be integrated into this reporting and accounting process. For the 
bilateral crediting approaches, the transactional set-up is less complex and therefore could 
benefit from levying an SOP per issued or transferred credit. Whether the SOP should be col-
lected at first transfer – as outlined in the Doha Amendment – may however be difficult as the 
definition of ‘first transfer’ remains unclear. 
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The SOP can either be levied as a monetary fee or at a percentage rate. While the general per-
ception of the SOP is that it is based on a percentage rate, this does not have to be the case. 
Given the variety of approaches, very different market prices, confidentiality of prices and the 
lack of a common market for ITMOs, a percentage rate does not seem sensible. The SOP could 
instead be levied using a monetary levy for each ITMO transferred, (e.g. USD 0.10/ tCO²e or 
ITMO). This concept has already been tested and proven to work for the administrative SOP 
under the CDM. It could be applied to both the linking of ETS as well as bilateral crediting 
approaches, and even be used in cases where ITMOs are denominated in metrics other than 
CO²e.
The final question is whether the transferring or acquiring Party should be taxed. While 
in principle the question could also be left to the cooperating Parties to decide, it does seem 
more productive to have a clear ruling at UN level to avoid lengthy negotiations. While eco-
nomic theory and particularly the discipline of public finance knows various principles for allo-
cating taxes, we consider that the most relevant aspects to guide the decision in this case, are 
the ability to pay as well as where the economic benefit accrues. This leads us to recommend 
that the SOP should be charged to the acquiring Party, just as a value-added tax is levied 
on the end-user of a good. 
Taxing the acquiring party is intuitive in the case of bilateral crediting schemes between devel-
oped and developing countries, where the acquiring party tends to be the one with greater 
ability to pay. In the case of ETS linking, however, it is not necessarily predetermined which of 
the countries will emerge as net importer of allowances and become the acquiring party of 
ITMOs. Also, this position may shift over time. It can be argued that the acquiring party has 
the clearer economic benefit as it achieves its NDC target at lower cost through the import 
of ITMOs. The transferring party, on the other hand, benefits from the sale of goods and an 
influx of finance. However, the economic gain is less clear-cut because in order to do so, it 
must overachieve its own environmental target to serve both its NDC and be able to transfer 
emission reductions.
As ITMO balances are accounted on the country level, the SOP would be payable by govern-
ments. The question therefore arises how governments could pay the SOP if the economic 
benefits are reaped by the emitting installations in the form of cheaper allowances, as would 
be the case under an ETS linking transaction. For ETS linking, the SOP could be funded from 
auctioning proceeds. For baseline and crediting schemes, an SOP fee could simply be added to 
the purchasing price for ITMOs. How governments would collect the SOP back from the emit-
ters would, however, have to be resolved at the level of individual cooperative approaches 
and is not subject to UN regulations.
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5. CONCLUSION
This policy-oriented study has addressed the technical questions around the introduction of 
a tax on market mechanism activities (“share of proceeds”, SOP) on both Art. 6.2 and 6.4 
and formulated practical solutions for the concerns brought up in the negotiations. The CDM 
offers vital lessons on which recommendations can be based. For example, the administra-
tion SOP levied in cash generated huge surpluses due to a much larger than expected level of 
activities, but policymakers were unable to adjust the administration SOP level downwards. 
The adaptation SOP levied in kind generated much less revenues than expected because the 
trustee did not sell credits when the prices were high, and the bulk of credits accrued when 
the prices had already fallen to negligible levels. This leads us to recommend a mix of a mon-
etary and in-kind SOP, and a regular decision on adjustment of the administration SOP level. 
We also recommend allocating a share of the SOP to the host countries to cover administra-
tive costs at their level. Exemptions for LDCs should continue.
Some issues are, however, of political nature or require further analysis. In contrast to repeated 
statements by the opponents of an SOP on Art. 6.2, there are no technical reasons that would 
prevent levying an SOP on Art. 6.2. Among the issues requiring further reflection is the level of 
the SOP to be imposed, given various scenarios for market size, ITMO and A6.4ER prices, esti-
mation of resource needs and considering at what level detrimental effects to credit volume 
would emerge. The optimal level of the SOP further depends on whether it is levied exclusively 
on Art 6.4 or on Art 6.4 and Art 6.2 collectively, in which case a lower SOP level would generate 
the same level of revenues. Finally, and most crucially, it has to be understood where the polit-
ical compromise can be found between Parties rejecting an SOP for Art 6.2 outright and those 
advocating for it. First, a rapid entry into force of the Doha Amendment would give a boost to 
those advocating a coverage of all market mechanisms by the SOP. Furthermore, the nuances 
of the design may come into play, such as reducing the number of transactions on which the 
SOP is levied, e.g. by levying the SOP only on the annual balance of ITMOs, granting exceptions 
for certain types of cooperative approaches, e.g. such as linking ETS, accepting a lower level 
SOP for Art. 6.2 or considering whether or under which conditions a voluntary SOP on Art. 6.2 
would be acceptable. While COP 25 must focus on resolving the political impasse, the details 
of the operationalization could be left to the Art. 6 work programme.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1: SUBMISSIONS ON SOP LEVIED ON ARTICLE 6.2
AOSIS inputs to APA agenda items (Dec. 2018): We also believe a 5% share of proceeds for 
adaptation, applied under Art.s 6.2 and 6.4 will help increase adaptation. We see these two 
elements as valuable tools that will support both the credibility and utility of Art. 6. 
AGN submission on Art. 6.2 guidance (2017): Share of Proceeds: Shall apply to both Art.s 6.2 
and 6.4 and fund adaptation and sustainable development for developing country Parties of 
the Paris Agreement.
AOSIS submission on Art. 6.2 guidance (2017): In addition, the achievement of an overall 
mitigation in global emissions and the delivery of a share of proceeds for adaptation are 
features of the 6.4 mechanism, but they could also be features of cooperative approaches 
under Art. 6.2, so that Art. 6 as a whole contributes to the mitigation and adaptation goals of 
the Paris Agreement. The application of these Art. 6.4 elements under Art. 6.2 would avoid 
disadvantaging the role of Art. 6.4 and leverage the utility of these provisions. 
Arab Group submission on Art. 6.2 guidance (2017): Share of proceeds: Shall apply to both 
Art.s 6.2 and 6.4 and fund adaptation and sustainable development for developing country 
Parties of the Paris Agreement. These shares of proceeds shall be allocated to the Adaptation 
Fund.
LDC submission on Art. 6.2 guidance (2017): 19. Share of Proceeds: All ITMOs transactions 
should be subject to a “share of proceeds” arrangement whereby a certain percentage of 
traded units would be reserved and paid into a centralised account maintained by the Central 
Oversight Mechanism to be used for funding adaptation activities. The centralized account 
would be a holding account for transfer to the Adaptation Fund, originally established under 
the Kyoto Protocol and through a decision authorised to operate under the Paris Agreement.
LMDC submission on Art. 6.2 guidance (2017): Share of proceeds should also be applied 
to the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) in Art. 6.2 where it would be 
equally relevant and effective. Extending 4 the share of proceeds provision to Art. 6.2 would 
also ensure that activities under Art. 6.4 would not be unduly disadvantaged.
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ANNEX 2: SYNOPSIS OF NEGOTIATION TEXTS
Table 2: Evolution of negotiation text on SOP under Art. 6.2 
 SBSTA TEXT, 08.12.2018 “LOST TEXT”, 14.12.2018
PRESIDENCY TEXT, 
14.12.2018
Option A
54. Cooperative approaches [shall][should] deliver 
a share of proceeds to be used to assist developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation.
55. The share of proceeds [shall][should] be col-
lected in respect of:
Option A1
(a) cooperative approaches that are baseline and 
crediting approaches that are similar to mitigation 
activities under the mechanism established by Art. 6 
paragraph 4;
Option A2
(b) crediting approaches implemented by Parties.
Option A3
(c) all cooperative approaches;
Option A4
(d) all acquisition of ITMOs
{end of Option A4}
56. The share of proceeds [shall][should] be set at 
and levied at {potential list below}:
Option A1
(a) X per cent/5 per cent/an increasing per cent/a 
diminishing per cent of the amount of ITMOs trans-
ferred/used towards achievement of an NDC;
Option A2
(b) X percent at first transfer, increasing by Y per-
cent at each subsequent transfer;
Option A3
(c) Consistent with the share of proceeds pursuant 
to Art. 6, paragraph 6, for the mechanism estab-
lished by Art. 6, paragraph 4.
{end of Option A3}
57. The share of proceeds [shall][should] be {poten-
tial list below}:
(a) Collected by the creating/issuing Party at the first 
transfer of ITMOs and/or collected by a Party using 
ITMOs towards achievement of its NDC;
(b) Transferred by the creating/issuing Party to the 
Adaptation Fund;
(c) Collected by the acquiring Party at each ITMO 
transfer and transferred to the Adaptation Fund.
Option B
{no text required}
Text moved to decision 
section
5. Acknowledges the consid-
eration of the SBSTA in rela-
tion to a share of proceeds 
for cooperative approaches 
that are baseline and cred-
iting approaches similar to 
mitigation activities under 
the mechanism estab-
lished by Art. 6, paragraph 
4; crediting approaches 
implemented by Parties; all 
cooperative approaches; or 
all acquisitions of interna-
tionally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes;
(a) The share of proceeds 
could be levied at a specific 
percentage of five per cent, 
an increasing percentage, a 
diminishing percentage of 
the amount of internation-
ally transferred mitigation 
outcomes transferred or 
used towards a nationally 
determined contribution, a 
specific percentage at first 
transfer, increasing by a 
specific percentage at each 
subsequent transfer, or 
consistent with the share 
of proceeds pursuant to 
Art. 6, paragraph 6, for the 
mechanism established by 
Art. 6, paragraph 4;
(b) The share of proceeds 
could be collected by the 
creating or issuing Party at 
the first transfer of interna-
tionally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes; collected by 
a Party using internationally 
transferred mitigation 
outcomes towards its 
nationally determined 
contribution; transferred by 
the creating or issuing Party 
to the Adaptation Fund; or 
collected by the acquiring 
Party at the transfer of each 
internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes trans-
fer and transferred to the 
Adaptation Fund;
Text moved back into 
guidance
39. Cooperative approaches 
[shall][should] deliver a 
share of proceeds to be 
used to assist developing 
country Parties that are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate 
change to meet the costs of 
adaptation.
40. The share of proceeds 
[shall][should] be collected 
in respect of [coopera-
tive approaches that are 
baseline and crediting 
approaches that are similar 
to mitigation activities 
under the mechanism 
established by Art. 6 
paragraph 4] [crediting 
approaches implemented 
by Parties] [all cooperative 
approaches] [all acquisition 
of ITMOs].
41. The share of proceeds 
[shall][should] be set at and 
levied at [X per cent / 5 per 
cent / an increasing per cent 
/ a diminishing per cent 
of the amount of ITMOs 
transferred / used towards 
achievement of an NDC] 
[X percent at first transfer, 
increasing by Y percent at 
each subsequent transfer] 
[consistent with the share 
of proceeds pursuant to 
Art. 6, paragraph 6, for the 
mechanism established by 
Art. 6, paragraph 4].
42. The share of proceeds 
[shall][should] be [collected 
by the creating/issuing 
Party at the first transfer 
of ITMOs and/or collected 
by a Party using ITMOs 
towards achievement of its 
NDC] [transferred by the 
creating/issuing Party to the 
Adaptation Fund] [collected 
by the acquiring Party at 
each ITMO transfer and 
transferred to the Adapta-
tion Fund].
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Table 3: Evolution of the negotiation texts on the share of proceeds for 
the Art. 6.4 mechanism
 SBSTA TEXT, 08.12.2018 “LOST TEXT”, 14.12.2018 PRESIDENCY TEXT, 14.12.2018
40. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of pro-
ceeds to cover administrative 
expenses for registration of 
the activity when submitting 
a request for registration, at 
the level determined by the 
Supervisory Body.
41. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of pro-
ceeds to cover administrative 
expenses for registering the 
activity when submitting a 
request for registration, at the 
level determined by the CMA
42. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of pro-
ceeds to cover administrative 
expenses for registering the 
activity when submitting a 
request for registration, at the 
level determined by the CMA.
45. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of pro-
ceeds to cover administra-
tive expenses for issuance 
of A6.4ERs when submitting 
a request for issuance of 
A6.4ERs at the level of USD X 
per A6.4ER to be issued.
46. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of proceeds 
to cover the administrative 
expenses for issuing A6.4ERs 
when submitting a request 
for issuance of A6.4ERs at the 
level determined by the CMA.
47. The activity participants 
shall pay a share of proceeds 
to cover the administrative 
expenses for issuing A6.4ERs 
when submitting a request 
for issuance of A6.4ERs at the 
level determined by the CMA.
56. The share of proceeds 
from an Art. 6, paragraph 4 
activity that is levied to assist 
developing country Parties 
that are particularly vulnera-
ble to the adverse effects of 
climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation shall be 
delivered to [the Adaptation 
Fund][the relevant mechanism 
registry account].
56. The share of proceeds 
from an Art. 6, paragraph 4, 
activity that is levied to assist 
developing country Parties 
that are particularly vulnera-
ble to the adverse effects of 
climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation shall be 
delivered to the Adaptation 
Fund.
58. The share of proceeds 
from an Art. 6, paragraph 4, 
activity that is levied to assist 
developing country Parties 
that are particularly vulnera-
ble to the adverse effects of 
climate change to meet the 
costs of adaptation shall be 
delivered to the Adaptation 
Fund.
57. The share of proceeds for 
adaptation shall be set and 
levied at: 
Option A
(a) [X/5] per cent at issuance;
Option B
(b) [X5] per cent at [forward-
ing][first transfer];
Option C
(c) [X/5] per cent at [forward-
ing][first transfer], increasing 
by Y per cent at each subse-
quent transfer.
57. The share of proceeds 
for adaptation shall be set 
and levied at X per cent at 
issuance.
59. The share of proceeds for 
adaptation shall be set and 
levied at [five] per cent at 
issuance.
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